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ci.2011.1Abstract The paper investigates the problem of managing multiple encryption keys generation
overhead issues in scalable video coding (H.264/SVC) and proposes a hierarchical top down keys
generation and distribution system by using a standard key management protocol MIKEY
(Multimedia Internet Keying Protocol). The research goal is two-fold; (1) prevention of information
leakage by the selective encryption of network abstraction layer (NAL) units with AES-CTR block
cipher algorithm, and (2) reduction of multiple layer encryption keys overhead for scalable video
distribution. We combine a MIKEY with the digital rights management (DRM) techniques to
derive a mechanism in which every entitled user of each layer has only one encryption key to
use, but this key will transparently open the doors of all layers below. The timing results are calcu-
lated for the encryption/decryption and the key generation processes relative to encoding/decoding
time of test video ﬁles, which are noticeably negligible. The scheme is enormously suitable for video
distribution to users who have subscribed to various video qualities regarding their desire or con-
straints on their devices and helps in preventing the loss of revenue of paid services.
ª 2011 King Saud University. Production and hosting by Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.1. Introduction
Codecs are developed to compress the video, reduce the stor-
age space and bandwidth requirement of transported streams.
The Joints Video Team of the ITU-T VCEG and the ISO/IEC
MPEG has standardized a scalable video coding (SVC) which
is an extension of the H.264/AVC standard (Wiegand et al.,
2003; Ostermann and Bormans, 2004). Scalable video coding909391129.
.uk (M.N. Asghar), ghan@
Saud University.
g by Elsevier
. Production and hosting by Elsev
2.002(H.264/SVC) (Schwarz et al., 2007) allows the transmission
and decoding of partial bit streams to provide video services
at various temporal or spatial resolutions or quality, as well
as preserving a reconstruction quality that is high compared
to the rate of the partial bit streams. So, SVC functionalities
provide improvements to transmission and storage applica-
tions. SVC has attained remarkable improvements in coding
efﬁciency with an increased degree of supported scalability rel-
ative to the scalable proﬁles of the previous video coding
standards.
Cryptography is a conventional technique to provide secu-
rity to the multimedia content. Most of the research regarding
security that has been done in the context of video content is
naive and or based on selective encryption. All Cipher algo-
rithms require the data as input but also need a unique value
known as ‘key’ for the operation on plain text as describedier B.V. All rights reserved.
108 M.N. Asghar, M. Ghanbariby Kerckhoff’s principle which states that the rival can know
the chosen cipher algorithm but not the key (Cayre et al.,
2005). The key generation and distribution is the critically
tackled issue to enhance the security of any cipher algorithm.
Some recent work on keys generation/distribution for standard
and scalable video coding is reviewed here. Recently authors
(Wang et al., 2010) pointed out the idea of hierarchical key
generation for the cipher algorithm to encrypt the partial
H.264/AVC video content. The protection for scalable video
coding has been described in (Won et al., 2006; Kim et al.,
2007). Li et al. (2009) have devised a NAL level selective
encryption technique for H.264/ SVC with stream cipher
LEX (Leak Extraction) Algorithm. The LEX uses three keys
for the three NAL units individually. The study has pointed
out some future work on the key management scheme, which
is a key issue in the security of any cipher algorithm. Park and
Shin (2009) have designed a hierarchical key management
scheme for the selective encryption of scalable video coding.
The key management scheme provides the robustness against
the known brute-force attack due to the different NAL unit
keys.
All the reviewed researches have their own devised key
management mechanisms but they don’t refer to any standard
key management protocol. The authors (Gregory et al., 1995)
pointed out that the earlier data communication protocols/
standards have very few security features. Generally, the secu-
rity is handled at system level that uses the communication
protocols, but these days the communication protocols alone
cannot handle the proliferating security demands in mobile de-
vices (smart phones, ipads, notebooks and laptops) so there is
a need of some key management infusion to enhance the func-
tionality of communication security protocols.
For the scalable layers key generation/distribution, we have
used the standard Multimedia Internet Keying Protocol
(MIKEY) (Arkko et al., 2004) which is a signiﬁcant addition
to the security of speciﬁcally designed multimedia to tackle
the key exchange problems in real-time networks. The worth
of IETF standard protocol-MIKEY can be examined by its
use in commercial applications in the past few years. A number
of famous commercial applications like Erricsson (Blom and
Cheng, 2009), IPWireless Inc. (Zisimopoulos, 2008), Huawei
Technologies Co., Ltd. (Sun and Kong, 2009; Liu, 2007; Doerr
et al., 2009) and Siemens (Horn and Kro¨selberg, 2004; Bu¨cker
and Horn, 2008) etc. are also using MIKEY as their key man-
agement protocol speciﬁcally for the security of multimedia
applications.
With the advent of digital media, the digital rights manage-
ment (DRM) becomes an issue for the digital content manu-
facturers and publishers. To implement DRM, many
methods for digital media have been adopted (Lawrence,
2007). For DRM, cryptographic techniques alone are not
enough to provide the ﬂexible content delivery and secure
usage. Much work has been done on the joint DRM security
techniques, i.e. encryption along with key management (Lin
et al., 2005), encryption along with ﬁnger printing (Kundur
and Karthik, 2004) and encryption along with digital water-
marking (Fan et al., 2009; Ju et al., 2003; Thomas et al.,
2009). Zou et al. (2007) proposed a selective encryption
technique for H.264 video which is adaptive to DRM. The
scheme (Zou et al., 2007) claimed to be suitable for the multi-
media storage as well as the transmission of digital video.The proposed key management scheme provides the
‘‘Conﬁdentiality Encryption’’, that is the complete security to
the content with full encryption (Hofbauer and Uhl, 2009)
which is extremely desirable in conﬁdential defense/military
applications. The presented research work incorporates the
following DRM security processes.
(1) Authentication key will be derived for the authentica-
tions of sender and receiver.
(2) Encryption of data with block cipher algorithm.
(3) Key management with standard protocol.
2. Video codec H.264/SVC
With the steady growth of multimedia streaming over the
Internet, the streaming applications demand a variable band-
width over best-effort Internet. In video streaming applica-
tion, the servers have to support a large number of users
with different screen resolutions and network bandwidth. If
the screen resolution of a user is too small and the bandwidth
between the user and server is narrow to support high frame
rate, resolution and quality then the need of low quality video
arises. Scalable video coding (SVC) has served the server to
fulﬁll the objective of variable frame rate, resolution and
ﬁdelity.
Scalable video coding (H.264/SVC) is the emerging model
and has quickly come up to satisfy the needs of multimedia ser-
vices. SVC technology permits devices to send and receive mul-
ti-layered bit streams; it allows the transmission and decoding
of partial bit streams to provide video services with different
frame rates, spatial resolutions (picture size) and quality on
base enhancement layers. A top level view of SVC model is
shown in Fig. 1 which shows the possibility of partially deco-
dable video stream according to the requirement of the receiv-
ing device. The base layer has the minimum data which can
better serve the small devices alone; the enhancement layers
have more data in hierarchy from bottom to top. The top
enhancement layer has maximum frame rate, picture resolu-
tion and quality to serve the need of high resolution devices
(HD TV).
H.264/SVC uses two entropy coding modes, variable length
coding (VLC) and binary arithmetic coding (BAC), both of
these designs are used in a context adaptive (CA) way, known
as CAVLC and CABAC. Syntax elements at and below the
slice layer can be adaptively coded. The CAVLC requires less
complexity than CABAC during encoding of H.264/SVC lay-
ers while CABAC provides an average of about 10% more
compression at the cost of more complexity than CAVLC.
The SVC layers are identiﬁed by three identiﬁers (IDs)
which are in NAL header in Fig. 2; the temporal ID (T),
dependency ID (D) and quality (i.e. SNR) ID (Q), which are
written as a triplet (D,T,Q). For example, the base layer
NAL unit of the lowest temporal resolution and SNR scalabil-
ity is identiﬁed as (0,0,0). It is possible to combine the three
concepts of temporal, spatial and SNR scalabilities together.
The upper layers of scalable video are predicted on the founda-
tion of lower layers.
H.264 has a two layer architecture; video coding layer
(VCL) and network abstraction layer (NAL); VCL is used
for video compression and NAL is used for VCL and the aux-
Figure 1 SVC encoder functionality.
F NRI Type NALu Payload
4 bytes NAL unit Header
R I PRID N DID QID TID U D O RR
1 1 6 1 3 4 3 1 1 1 21 2 5
Figure 2 SVC NAL unit.
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unit deﬁnes a generic format for sending video data over both
packet oriented (e.g., Internet protocol/RTP systems) and bit
stream oriented transport systems (e.g., H.320 and MPEG-2/
H.222.0 systems). VCL NAL units contain data that represent
video pictures in the form of a slice or data partition, while the
non-VCL NAL units contain other additional information
such as parameter sets, timing information and other supple-
mental data. For SVC, each NAL unit comprises of a four byte
header and variable number of bytes payload holding coded
symbols (Wang and Schierl, 2010). A set of NAL units has
the complete decoded picture which is called access unit.
SVC NAL unit is shown in Fig. 2.
Regarding the conventional technique of data security, we
require encrypting the scalable layers altogether. But if that
happens, the users subscribed for the different layer video
may not be able to receive the desired layer data separately,
hence destroying the purpose of scalable video coding. To
get the beneﬁt of multiple scalable layers, we need to encrypt
them separately as per layer basis. This scheme helps the users
to get the entitled data according to their bandwidth, storage
and rendering devices’ capabilities.
3. Cryptography
Cryptography is the mathematical science of converting read-
able data (plaintext) into secret codes (ciphertext). It is a pri-
meval art to scramble or replace the known codes with the
un-known codes, which began with the historical era with
the advent of writing. Cryptographic methods are imple-
mented by the use of cryptosystems. These systems comprise
of two parts (Wohlmacher, 1998):
(1) Algorithms with a series of steps having a set of func-
tions with parameters and
(2) The set of keys.Cryptographic algorithms are never a secret; their steps are
always open to everyone. The object which should be a secret
and needs to be hidden from public and unauthorized access
is the KEY, used by cryptographic algorithms. With the key
classiﬁcation, there are two types of cipher algorithms,
symmetric ciphers (shared key) and asymmetric ciphers (two
different keys). The symmetric key technique further catego-
rizes itself into block ciphers and stream ciphers. The block
ciphers encrypt the plaintext block by block of pre-deﬁned
size, i.e. the block of 32bytes, 64 bytes or 128 bytes. These
algorithms are efﬁcient in terms of speed and after encryption
the message size is not changed while the stream ciphers use
the function to encrypt the plaintext bit by bit in a stream al-
most like reading a ﬁle character by character and encrypting
it. The message length gets changed after encryption by the
stream ciphers (Kuchar, 2000). The strength of cipher algo-
rithms are related to the key size. Even the algorithms are
not so secure but with larger key size and excellent key man-
agement scheme, their performance can be enhanced (Sidek
et al., 2007).
Many cryptographic algorithms have been proposed and
implemented for the preceding half century. All of the algo-
rithms have individual characteristics and usage.
3.1. Advanced encryption standard (AES)
The Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) (Schaad and
Housley, 2002), also known as Rijndael, is a standardized
cipher algorithm by the US government. It is a symmetric
key block cipher (128-bit block size) based on modiﬁed substi-
tution-permutation network. After the rigorous analysis of
AES, it is being widely used all over the world. AES can use
keys of three lengths, 128 bits, 192 bits and 256 bits. With
the increase in key size the encryption round steps also increase
as the total round steps with 128 bit key are 10, with 192 bit
Figure 3 AES operation.
Figure 4 Scalable layers.
Table 1 Set of encryption keys should be held for each layer.
Layers Encryption keys held for each layer
Li eK0, eK1, eK2, eK3, . . . , eKi1, eKi
Li1 eK0, eK1, eK2, eK3, . . . , eKi1
. . . . . .
L2 eK0, eK1, eK2
L1 eK0, eK1
L0 eK0
110 M.N. Asghar, M. Ghanbarikey are 12 and 256 bit key are 14. For both cipher and de-ci-
pher, the AES algorithm uses a round function that is com-
prised of four different byte-oriented transformations shown
in Fig. 3:
The reason to choose the AES in counter mode (CTR) is
that, it is a block cipher, which takes the data block of 128 bits
at a time for encryption; it makes the encryption process efﬁ-
cient for the large data rather than using any stream cipher.
4. Multimedia Internet Keying Protocol (MIKEY)
Multimedia Internet Keying Protocol (MIKEY) is an impor-
tant addition to the security of multimedia speciﬁcally designed
to tackle the key exchange problem especially in real-time net-
works. It is used for the key management of one-to-one, one-
to-many and many to many small-size group communications.
The key management protocol is devised to enable the end-to-
end security, i.e. only the participants involved in the communi-
cation have authorized access to the generated key(s) and hence
to the content. The key generation is simple and efﬁcient.
MIKEY uses a total of Eight (08) keys. The keys will be
generated on either the sender side or both sides (sender and
receiver).
(1) TGK (trafﬁc generation key).
(2) TEK (trafﬁc encryption key).
(3) Encryption keys (total 02, one each for sender and
receiver).
(4) Authentication keys (total 02, one each for sender and
receiver).
(5) Salting keys (total 02, one each for sender and receiver).
MIKEY has supported ﬁve methods for transporting/
establishing a TGK or to setup a common secret, for the all
communication scenarios by using:
(a) Pre-shared key.
(b) Public-key encryption.
(c) Difﬁe–Hellman (DH) key exchange.
(d) DH-HMAC (HMAC-authenticated Difﬁe–Hellman).
(e) RSA-R (reverse RSA).
In all the above mentioned methods, the DH is more
desirable as it provides the Perfect Forward Secrecy (PFS).
This research has implemented Difﬁe–Hellman (Difﬁe and
Hellman, 1976) for key establishment integrated with a keyed
hash message authentication code (HMAC) (Euchner, 2006)for attaining combined authentication and message integrity
of the key management messages exchange.
5. Proposed key management scheme
The paper devises a key management (generation/distribution)
scheme to enhance the security of scalable video coding layers
on the application level. The security to the scalable data
means to provide the encryption on all layers of data from
L0 (base layer) to Ln (top enhancement layer). Let us assume
user Ui is subscribed to receive the data of layer Li, so he must
have access to all the lower layer encryption keys, i.e. eK0 to
eKi to be able to decode the subscribed layer data because
the encryption is applied from layer L0 to Li as shown in Fig. 4.
The management of all sets of layer Li keys (shown in
Table 1) for user Ui is a huge security hazard. The handling
of multiple keys for user Li data is complicated especially when
the salable data have a large number of layers. Many problems
arise with the large number of keys generation especially
computational cost of generating the multiple keys at once
to get the L0 to Li layer data, memory consumption and time
to save the eK0 to eKi keys which are sizeable as per security
needs. So, the goal is to derive a mechanism in which each user
needs to hold single encryption key to retrieve his subscribed
layer data. Thus a number of keys will not travel over the net-
work, hence reducing security hazard.
MIKEY generates the two major keys (TGK and TEK)
which will further generate the lower keys in a hierarchical
fashion. The MIKEY keys are:
i Trafﬁc generation key (TGK): It is the master key and
mutually generated and distributed by the sender &
receiver using Difﬁe–Hellman (DH) key exchange agree-
ment method after every month.
ii Trafﬁc encryption key (TEK): It is generated by the
TGK on the sender side and transported to the receiver
after encryption by AES with TGK by using HMAC
with TGK and MIKEY’s speciﬁed TEK constant value
Table 2 Characteristics of MIKEY keys.
Keys Key length
(bits)
Generation/distribution methods
and parameters
MIKEY constants Key life time
TGK (master key) 128 Diﬃe–Hellman DH prime and base
values
01 month
TEK (traﬃc
encryption key)
128 HMAC-SHA1(TGK) 0x2AD01C64 Daily for 12 h
Master encryption
key (eK)
128 HMAC-SHA1(TEK) 0x15798CEF For session
Authentication key
(aK)
160 HMAC-SHA1(TEK) 0x1B5C7973 Unique for
every user
Salt keys (sK) 112 HMAC-SHA1(TEK) 0x39A2C14B Daily for 12 h
Figure 5 Key generation mechanism.
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generated on daily basis. It will be used for 12 h during
the day.
iii Master encryption key (eK): The TEK will generate the
top layer encryption key (Master) by the use of HMAC
and the MIKEY’s speciﬁed Encryption key constant
value (see Table 2) on both sender and receiver side. It
will be used for the encryption of SVC top layer
contents.
iv Authentication key (aK): The TEK will generate the
authentication key by the use of HMAC and the
MIKEY’s speciﬁed authentication key constant value
(see Table 2) on both sender and receiver side. It will
be used for the authentication purpose of parties.
v Salt key (sK): The TEK will also generate the salt key
by the use of HMAC and the MIKEY’s speciﬁed salt
key constant value (see Table 2) on both sender and
receiver side. It is used to alter some bytes of TEK to
enhance the security. The salt keys are generated to alter
some bytes of TEK to enhance the security on daily
basis. The few bytes of salt key are replaced in the
TEK and after 12 h use of TEK, the salted TEK will
be used for the next 12 h.
The general equations for overall keys generation scheme
are:
TGK! gsrmodpðDiffie–HellmanÞ ð1Þ
where p= prime no., g= generator, sr = sender and receiver
RAND values
TEK! HMAC ðTGK; MIKEY constant
kRAND; TEK lengthÞ ð2Þ
MastereK! HMAC ðTEK; MIKEY eK constant
kRAND; eK lengthÞ ð3Þ
aK! HMAC ðTEK; MIKEY aKconstant
kRAND; aK lengthÞ ð4Þ
sK! HMAC ðTEK; MIKEY sKconstant
kRAND;sK lengthÞ ð5Þ
The TEK further generates the encryption key, authentication
key and salt keys. Table 2 shows the characteristics of all
MIKEY keys (key length, life time and constants) with their
generation/distribution summaries.i SVClower layers encryption keys: The master encryption
key further generates the lower layer keys to encrypt the
content of SVC lower layers by the use of self deﬁned
constants for each layer as mentioned by MIKEY spe-
ciﬁc constants. The keys are generated recursively in
hierarchical fashion, i.e. top enhancement SVC layer
Ln encryption key eKn will generate its immediate lower
Ln1 key eKn1 by using its own value, the eKn1 will
generate eKn2 key and so on, on the receiver side. The
general equations for generation of encryption keys for
lower SVC layers are:eKn ! HMAC ðTEK; eKn constantkRAND; eKnlengthÞ ð6Þ
eKn1 ! HMAC ðeKn; eKn1 constant
kRAND; eKn1 lengthÞ ð7Þ
eKn2 ! HMAC ðeKn1; eKn2 constant
kRAND;eKn2 lengthÞ ð8Þ
RAND is generated according to the PRF (a keyed pseudo-
random function) in (Arkko et al., 2004). The overall key gen-
eration scheme is shown in Fig. 5.
Figure 6 Keys per scalable layer.
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solution will work for the encryption of layers by using
AES-CM cipher algorithm. The idea behind the encryption
of scalable layers can be easily understood from Fig. 6.
Three ascending order scalable layers are shown in Fig. 6,
lowest is the base layer and the upper two are enhancement
layers 1 and 2. According to Fig. 6 the frames 1 and 5 (horizon-
tal line pattern) are on the base layer, they will be encrypted by
the key eK0. The three frames are on the immediate upper layer
of the base layer 1, 3 and 5. Frames 1 and 5 are already
encrypted by the base layer key eK0 so; only frame 3 (bricks
pattern) belongs to layer Ln1 which will be encrypted by
key eKn1. This process of encryption is continued on all the
above layers and the frames which are already encrypted on
the lower layers will not be re-encrypted on the upper layers.
Only the respective layer frame(s) will be encrypted with the
corresponding layer encryption key. The general equations
for the bit streams encryption on all layers:
eKn ðencryptsÞ ! Ln frames Ln1 Frames ð9Þ
eKn1 ! Ln1 frames Ln2 frames ð10Þ6. Experimental results
The performance of the proposed key management scheme has
been tested with the SVC reference software (Joint Scalable Vi-
deo Model) JSVM 9.19.8 version encoder. The experiments
run on a machine Intel Core i3-330M (2.13GHz) processor
with 4GB RAM.
For the evaluation of results; the experiments are per-
formed over four different CIF and two 4CIF test video se-
quences, which were encoded into four layers with ﬁve
temporal, two spatial and two SNR resolutions (levels). All
four layers are encoded with variable bit-rate (VBR), GOP
size is 16 frames and with the same Intra period, for both
CAVLC and CABAC entropy coding modes. The proposedTable 3 Timings (in seconds) of sample 4CIF video.
Sample 4CIF timings 30 Frames 60 Frames
ICE (4CIF)
Encoding time 85 169
Encryption time 0.018 0.023
Decryption time 0.024 0.031
Decoding time 6.634 13.115
SOCCER (4CIF)
Encoding time 78 162
Encryption time 0.017 0.022
Decryption time 0.024 0.032
Decoding time 6.983 13.672encryption system is applied on NAL units per scalable video
layer. AES-CTR mode is used to encrypt the NAL units in
independent blocks of individual layer with 128 bit encryption
key and encrypts the whole NAL unit payload and leaves the
initial four bytes of NAL header un-encrypted. The NAL
header (Fig. 2) has some important information for the net-
work friendly behavior as it shows the priority of NAL unit
and some other information regarding the video quality of
services over the network so the NAL header should be open
while transferring over network. The other reason of NAL le-
vel security is that the NAL units can be routed and de-
crypted independently instead of collecting all of them
together till the whole encrypted ﬁle is created and then the
decryption will takes place, so the proposed scheme avoids
the delay at the receiver end. Thus we have more control over
the transmission of packets in case of independent NAL unit
encryption. The evaluation results encompass the encryption/
decryption and key generation timings with different number
of encoded frames using CAVLC entropy coding. The encod-
ing and decoding times varied for CABAC while the encryp-
tion/decryption times are same as with CAVLC entropy
coder.
The encryption/decryption time is calculated on the whole
encoded bit-stream; Table 3 shows the encoding, encryption,
decryption and decoding times (in seconds) for two 4CIF
Video sequences with different input frame rates. Encoding
times are taken in integer values for the sake of simplicity;
while encryption, decryption and decoding times are taken
up to three decimal places for the clear overhead estimation
of cryptography over video ﬁle. As Table 3 explains the time
taken for encryption relative to encoding and decoding of vi-
deo ﬁle is much smaller. Therefore, with negligible additional
computational cost, we are able to achieve security and selec-
tive distribution of bit streams.
The experiments are also performed on four different CIF
video sequences and the results are shown in the graph
(Fig. 7), which clearly show the negligibility of encryption
and decryption timings of four CIF test videos.
The graph (Fig. 8) depicts the time (microseconds) required
for generating the keys. For each subscriber, three keys TEK,
aK and a master key eK have to be derived. In addition,
depending upon the subscriber whether he has demanded
any subscribed layer key, the master encryption key is gener-
ated by the system for the subscribed layer, and given to him
then he derives his own encryption keys for all lower layers.
It is a hierarchical system and each layer encryption key eK
is derived from its former layer eK.90 Frames 120 Frames 150 Frames
270 330 420
0.034 0.041 0.045
0.040 0.048 0.055
19.963 25.669 32.022
255 342 455
0.032 0.042 0.047
0.39 0.049 0.057
21.796 28.151 34.021
Figure 7 Timings (in microseconds) for CIF sequences encoded
with 150 frames.
Figure 8 Keys generation timings.
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layers L8, L6, L4 and L2, but for generating hierarchical
encryption keys these have been derived from layer L8 to L0.
The experiments show that the timings of generating TEK,
aK and Master eK are the same whether they are being gener-
ated for layer L2 or layer L8. The difference is shown in key
generation timings of layers Ln to L0 eK which are derived
from the master eK. If the hierarchical encryption keys will
be generated for just two scalable layers (the base and enhance-
ment layer), it will take 49 microseconds and if they are gener-
ated for eight layers (one base and seven enhancement layers)
then it will take 93 microseconds. The timings of generating
hierarchical encryption keys depend on the number of SVC
layers from top to bottom and the layer encryption keys gen-
eration timings are included in the encryption and decryption
timings which are shown in Table 3 for 4CIF and in Fig. 7 for
CIF video sequences.
The graph clearly depicts that the keys generation time is
fairly negligible, so to make the system robustly secure, the
keys can be generated very often without any additional
overhead on encryption/decryption computational cost of the
proposed system.
7. Performance analysis
To evaluate the performance of the proposed DRM system in
detail, we have carried out the following analysis.
7.1. Security analysis
7.1.1. Brute force attack on encrypted data and keys
The brute force attack is a strategy to ﬁnd the correct value by
continuously trying every possible value for data/key bits in
turn, until the correct value is identiﬁed. Our proposed systemis secure enough against the brute force attack on encrypted
video data by considering the following countermeasures.
(1) The encryption process is much sensitive to key; the
encrypted data statistics are varying with even a single
key bit change, because the encryption key is XORed
with the video data in every AES encryption round.
As the TEK is changing after every 12 h, next time even
the same data will be encrypted with a different key.
This frequent key changing makes the possibility of
guessing data bits impossible.
(2) The encrypted NAL units can eavesdrop during trans-
mission. Assuming a CIF frame of 352 · 288, the num-
ber of macroblocks would be (352 · 288)/
(8 \ 8) = 1584, thus the possibilities of attacking are
21584. This is an exceptionally large ﬁgure and cannot
be handled in a reasonable ﬁnite time. Note that if the
attacker will not decipher it methodically, he will use
brute force and will simply try various bits. But even
then, the number is so large that our video data are
fairly safe against brute force attacks.
The AES-CTR with 128 bit key is used in our proposed
work. The sample space in this case for brute force attack on
keys is 2128 which is again a large ﬁgure and current day com-
putational speeds of the computers cannot do it in a reason-
ably ﬁnite time. The time required to break the 128 bit key
by applying all possible keys at 50 billion keys/sec is
5 · 1021 years (Esslinger, 2010).
7.1.2. Distribution of attacks
Poisson probability distribution occurs when the probability p
of the event is small, while the number of possibilities n is large
and the np is of moderate size. It is also known as probability of
rare events, like customers visiting a bank, number of telephone
calls received on a switchboard per minute. In our case, the
number of possibilities is all the hackers launching an attack,
while, probability that an attack will be launched is small.
CISCO security statistics (Tesch and Abelar, 2006) show that,
an attack on a host machine occurs every ﬁve minutes, translat-
ing to about 300 attacks per day. We assume that 20% of these
attacks are on video. The Poisson distribution is given by:
PðXÞ ¼ e
llx
x
where e is constant = 2.718, l is the average number of attacks
in a given time interval. x is the number of attacks for which
probability is desired.
Each attack that is launched is not necessarily successful.
Let us say the attacks will need at least 12 h to succeed. There-
fore we have decided to change the key after every 12 h.
Another point to be noted is that even if an attack succeeds,
it will be successful for a very short duration, because in the
next 12 h, a new key will be used and previous successful
attack will be rendered useless.
7.2. Computational overhead
There are multiple parameters that create additional overhead
over the system to achieve the security. In the proposed
system, the computational overhead is not only estimated with
respect to key generation and encryption/decryption timings
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114 M.N. Asghar, M. Ghanbaribut there is also an important subject to be noticed, which is
the increase of ﬁle size after encryption when we are using a
block cipher. The proposed system applies the NAL level
encryption per layer rather than the whole bit-stream per
layer, to maintain the identity of NAL unit during transmis-
sion which is useful to avoid the decryption delay at the recei-
ver end. The block cipher AES takes the NAL unit payload
blocks which are multiples of 16 bytes and encrypts them.
But if the data block is less than 16 bytes, there is additional
bit stufﬁng, increasing the ﬁle size. Of course, it is removed
on the receiver side during decryption. It is observed during
experiments that the video ﬁles with smaller resolution (QCIF)
require more bit stufﬁng because of less payload data in NAL
units, so their ﬁle size increases further from 1% to a maxi-
mum of 4%. But the inﬂuence on CIF and 4CIF which have
higher resolutions is minimal as it results in 0.5% to maximum
2% ﬁle size raise.
7.3. Error tolerance
The cipher algorithms have the diffusion property, so the sin-
gle bit error can cause many erroneous bits after decryption.
The cipher chaining modes are not suitable for encrypting data
because they are not error tolerant.
For the sake of error tolerance the AES in counter mode
(CTR) is used to encrypt the NAL unit payload blocks inde-
pendently on individual SVC layer. The study (Massoudi
and Lefebvre, 2008) believes that the block ciphers with inde-
pendent block encryption provide a good stability between
security and error tolerance. It is obvious by the reviewed
study that if AES-CTR is an error tolerant cipher algorithm
then the scalable layers may not be much affected by the errors
after decryption.
7.4. Comparative analysis
The literature shows a few studies on key management of
scalable layers. For comparative analysis of our proposed
DRM scheme with the existing work, we choose three, al-
ready proposed encryptions with key management methods
for H.264/SVC. The chosen proposed techniques are com-
pared on the basis of the following parameters shown in
Table 4.
Li and Won, both have proposed the similar kind of key
management schemes for SVC. The keys are generated for
individual scalable NAL units. It means if a layer has three
different NAL units according to scalability features like
temporal, spatial and SNR then three different keys will
be derived and distributed to decode the individual layer.
Park has devised a key management scheme by creating
multiple keys, i.e. layer and NAL unit keys separately. This
key management scheme provides the robustness against the
known brute-force attacks due to the different NAL unit
keys.
To summarize, all the compared techniques are using
stream ciphers which are computationally expensive than a
block cipher and the security of stream ciphers is also ques-
tionable against attacks. All the discussed proposed schemes
are almost the same on producing NAL level keys with
complicated key generation algorithms, hence could not solve
the problem of multiple keys overhead for each layer and
still there is a need of some standardized key management
MIKEY for keys management of H.264 scalable video coded layers 115protocol to prove the strength of proposed key management
mechanism.
Our proposed DRM scheme is computationally fast with
minimal overhead and speciﬁcally designed to tackle the multi-
ple keys overhead issue of scalable layers.
8. Conclusions and future work
The paper presents the complete DRM solution for H.264 scal-
able layers by focusing on many critically important issues, i.e.
timing results, bit-rate overhead, security analysis and error
tolerance. After the detailed analysis of key management pro-
tocol, the strength of cipher algorithm for layer wise encryp-
tion, it is expected that the proposed DRM system will be a
desirable contribution for the security of scalable video coding.
The timing results for SVC stream encryption/decryption and
hierarchical keys generation proves the efﬁciency of the pro-
posed scheme. The keys generation timings are quite negligi-
ble; even the very often hierarchical keys generation does not
affect the system performance and robustness. The proposed
DRM system including key management scheme is fully func-
tional with CAVLC and CABAC encoded bit-streams. The
signiﬁcance of the proposed method is that, the subscriber of
each layer has only one encryption key to use, but this key
can open the doors of all the layers below. It is suitable for
video distribution to users who have subscribed to a different
video regarding bandwidth and different quality streams.
The same hierarchical key management scheme can be
implemented on partial encryption of scalable layers (Won
et al., 2006; Park and Shin, 2009) without any modiﬁcation.
Although research shows that the AES-CTR mode provides
a good support for error tolerance, but error recovery issues
can be investigated more in transmission scenarios of scalable
layers as future work.References
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